Scott McPherson's Web Presence

First, a tip of the hat to flu blogsite Birdflunewsflash (http://birdflunewsflash.wordpress.com) for breaking an amazing press release out of Seattle.

The Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (!), a well-known and publicly funded organization, has released a study, to be published in the CDC publication Emerging Infectious Diseases, in September.  The study confirms limited human-to-human transmission within the famous Sumatra, Indonesia family cluster in May, 2006.  I qoute from the release:

The cluster contained a chain of infection that involved a 10-year-old boy who probably caught the virus from his 37-year-old aunt, who had been exposed to dead poultry and chicken feces, the presumed source of infection. The boy then probably passed the virus to his father. The possibility that the boy infected his father was supported by genetic sequencing data. Other person-to-person transmissions in the cluster are backed up with statistical data. All but one of the flu victims died, and all had had sustained close contact with other ill family members prior to getting sick — a factor considered crucial for transmission of this particular flu strain.

As we all know, the only survivor, a man in his 20s, has permanent brain damage as a result of the H5N1 virus attacking his brain -- something only pandemic strains are known for.

The release -- and the study -- goes on to say:

The researchers estimated the secondary-attack rate of the virus in Indonesia — the risk of one infected person passing it to another — to be 29 percent, a level of infectiousness similar to statistical estimates for seasonal influenza A in the United States.

Whoa nelly, as Keith Jackson would say!  A secondary H5N1 human attack rate equaling that of seasonal influenza A??  That is troublesome, as it implies that once the virus has passed from chicken to human in Indonesia, as least, there is a secondary rate of infection that makes it nearly as easy to catch as seasonal H1N1 or H3N2. 

Now for something we already strongly suspected:  The famous Turkish cluster of 2006.  The authors point out:

The researchers also aimed their statistical transmission-assessment technology at another large avian-flu cluster in eastern Turkey that in 2006 infected eight people, four of whom died. In this case, the researchers did not find statistical evidence of human-to-human transmission, most likely due to a lack of sufficient data. "There probably was person-to-person spread there as well but we couldn't get all the information we needed for the analysis," Yang said.

No surprises there.  The lack of samples and the lack of knowledge speak volumes about the Turkish government's attitude toward reporting outbreaks.  But it is nice to see scientists and statisticians agreeing with us that H2H(2H) in all probability occurred there.

The study was funded and supported by the National Institute of General Medical Sciences, MIDAS network, and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.  NIAID doesn't give money easily or lightly. This institute is legit, and the study is peer-reviewed and comes out in a few days in CDC's flagship publication.

A recent study from St. Jude's, in Memphis, speaks about the Unlucky 13 genetic pointers that make a flu virus pandemic.  I have not read the study yet, but plan to on my way to Happy Valley to watch my boy (and FIU) play Penn State.  I will blog on that study upon my return.  In the meantime, this study shows that the Sumatra cluster hit a very, very unlucky Lotto jackpot last May.  And when you couple that with the August, 2006 Tamiflu blanket the WHO and the Indonesian government placed on 2,000+ members of four remote villages, it means -- let me say it again -- that something is going on down in Indonesia, and we need to know what it is now, rather than later.