It may sound unthinkable — the idea of denying life support to some people in a public health disaster like an epidemic. But a new report says doctors, health care workers and the public need to start thinking about it.
The report, by New York State health officials, grows out of the work of a group formed in 2006 to plan for the possibility of an influenza pandemic. The group focused on the breathing machines called ventilators.
Right now, there are enough ventilators to go around. But in an epidemic, there could be a severe shortage of machines and, more important, doctors and nurses to run them. At that point, the new report says, doctors and hospitals would have no choice but to start taking some people off the machines so that others could live.
Removal “is absolutely the crux of the problem,” said a lead author of the study, Dr. Tia Powell, who has spent much of her career studying medical ethics. “There are people who might survive who won’t get a chance at a ventilator if someone who is likely to die even with a vent is using it.”
Before an epidemic strikes, the report says, the public should confront the issue to ensure that any such triage decisions reflect community views, as well as ethical and clinical standards.
“It’s not really a technical solution,” said Dr. Powell, who directs the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law. “It’s values. And the people are the experts on that.”
The report, “Allocation of Ventilators in a Public Health Disaster,” appears in the March issue of Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, a quarterly journal of the American Medical Association.
The project began in response to outbreaks of bird or avian flu, H5N1 influenza, in Asia. Although just a few hundred people are known to have contracted the disease so far, most of them died of it. So a widespread outbreak would overwhelmingly strain the health care system, not just in machinery, but also in the doctors, nurses and other health care personnel needed to use it.
The report says triage, separating those who will receive treatment from those who will not, should largely depend on the prognosis for recovery, not on factors like underlying health or age.
“We are not interested in quality of life,” Dr. Powell said in an interview. “We are just interested in whether you are able to survive this particular crisis.”
Anyway, she said, age has not been “a particularly sensitive discriminator for survival” in H5N1 flu. Many of its victims have been young.
Though allocating scarce resources is a perennial topic among ethicists and health officials, the authors say their guidelines are the first of their kind in the nation and could be a template for rationing in other catastrophes.
“This kind of thinking, as scary or even horrifying as it may seem, is absolutely critical and is much better done now than on the fly in the middle of a pandemic,” said Dr. Art Kellerman of Emory University, an expert on emergency medicine.
Dr. Kellerman, who was not connected to the study, said that a crisis like a flu pandemic was a matter of when, not if, and that he was “frustrated with people who want to pretend that it won’t be an issue or simply pass the buck to the emergency care physician.”
The guidelines confront that issue explicitly, recommending the appointment of “triage officers” to make ventilator decisions based on information about the number of incoming patients and their conditions, but who will not be involved in caring for them. If doctors and nurses caring for the sick must also make these triage decisions, the report says, the resulting stress can be “corrosive.”
Under the guidelines, “the person who is providing your direct care is not going to be the person who decides whether you stay on the vent or go off,” Dr. Powell said. “You need to know they are advocating for you. They cannot be looking out the door at how many people are waiting for care.”
Dr. Powell noted that rationing — or as she said it is called, “providing alternative standards of care” — was repellent to many Americans. In the early days of kidney dialysis, when dialysis machines were scare, “we were so uncomfortable with that as a nation we essentially made dialysis available to everyone who needs it,” she said. Similarly, she said, much effort has gone into building a fair system for allocating organs for transplant.
But that work “does not really apply to this kind of crisis situation,” she said. “This is a genuine emergency. You are not going to have time to do a careful sorting out, by list.”
So the panel began work by identifying crucial factors for rationing, including these:
- Recognizing that patients deprived of mechanical breathing assistance should continue to receive care.
- Using scarce resources like mechanical ventilators to save the greatest number of lives while continuing to care for patients individually. “As the number of affected patients multiplies, accommodating these two goals will require making increasingly difficult decisions,” the report says.
- Planning, so as not to leave decisions in a pandemic “to exhausted frontline providers.” Public health agencies must accept this obligation, the report says, “despite the difficulties inherent in planning.”
- Applying any plan broadly and consistently.
- Publicizing guidelines, seeking public comments and incorporating suggested revisions.
For ventilators, the group established “exclusion criteria,” conditions that would classify people ineligible for ventilators. It includes recurrent cardiac arrest, metastatic cancer with a poor prognosis, severe burns, end-stage organ failure and neurological conditions with high expected mortality.
The report cites “much public comment” about whether it would be better to emphasize ventilator access for children rather than the elderly. And it lists kidney failure as a reason to withhold ventilator support, in part because patients needing dialysis already place increased demand on scarce nursing resources.
When a ventilator is removed from a patient who depends on it, the report says, health workers should follow their institutions’ existing guidelines for withdrawing life support and provide palliative care like sedation, so patients do not experience “air hunger.” In an epidemic, the report adds, “facilities should prepare for a significant increase in demand for palliative care.”
The guidelines are online at http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenza/pandemic/ventilators/.
Dr. Powell said she had discussed them at meetings of professional societies and at medical centers around the state and added that she hoped the new report would draw more public attention. One likely step, she said, would be to hold discussions by focus groups.
“The guidelines are intended to reflect the values of New Yorkers,” she said. “And if they don’t, we want advice on how to revise them.”
Dr. Kellerman of Emory said the report should not be allowed to gather dust. “It is important that those guidelines be out there and discussed and struggled with right now,” he said.
Many hospitals already struggle with chronically scarce resources like intensive care beds, he said, and in a pandemic the problem would be far, far worse.
Dr. Kellerman said he was not optimistic. In the first place, he said, the public tends to “tune out” on such disturbing questions. Or, he said, they may accept the guidelines only “until it’s their family member. Then people often feel very differently.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/health/25vent.html?ref=science
Reader Comments (10)
A few years ago, I did a post-graduate year on the social history of epidemics, and the experience of 1918 was my topic. It is quite extraordinary to look back and find how few survivor accounts there are — and even more, how few major works of social response. Almost every epidemic or dread disease in history has some major memorializing work of art, from the Black Death (The Decameron, among others), to TB (The Magic Mountain), to AIDS (Angels in America, Rent, many more). But for 1918, there are only two slender novellas (Pale Horse, Pale Rider and They Came Like Swallows). It is — as Alfred Crosby said in his excellent and under-noticed book America's Forgotten Pandemic — as if the trauma were so great that no one could bear to contemplate it. That's not an unusual response for an individual survivor; for a society, it's extraordinary.
An extraordinary response reflected, I think, in our current collective reticence to discuss the very real possibility that it will happen again. It’s as if we have an unacknowledged, but nonetheless visceral, awareness of what such an event may mean. Discussion of this issue in particular, no matter how gut-wrenching, must take place. Decide now how we will act then.
What vaccine?
The decision may not be a problem if there isn't an appropriate vaccine available. I'm not sure there will be considering the rapidly evolving nature of H5N1.
I agree, no name. I should have made clear that I was referring to vent/triage issue. This will be significant even in a pandemic less severe than the 1918-19 event.
A worthy point, No Name. There is a strong feeling -- almost a consensus -- among influena researchers that in order for any strain to "go pandemic," it has to give up something to get something in return. We all hope if the virus is H5N1, it at the very least gives up its extreme lethality. A bonus would be if it slowed its mutation/evolution enough to allow vaccine makers to "get in front of" the virus with a vaccine.
As you say, however, there are no guarantees with H5N1, and such swapping may not be the case, at which point it would just have to burn its way through the population. Los Alamos computer models have shown that antivirals simply delay the onset of a pandemic; they do nothing to stop it or solve it. But if enough people were on antivirals, maybe that would delay long enough to allow the vaccine makers to yell "Eureka!" and commence production.
That is the best anyone can hope for. Pandemic response is, at best, a delaying action, a constant fight and retreat until vaccine reinforcements arrive.
In 1957, when liability was not an issue and one person could move mountains by sheer gravitas, a vaccine was ready after four months. The book "Vaccinated" gives a nice, short retelling of the 1957 pandemic and the effort to shorten the timeline for a vaccine. I do not think this is possible today, regrettably. Maybe a prepandemic vaccine will provide marginal, life-or-death protection.
Good dialogue, all.
Vents are not saving H5N1 cases; if they do not get (double dose?) Tamiflu started at or before symptom onset,there are no good outcomes (and if they do get Tamiflu,they seem to need double duration; to make sure all the virus is knocked down). No one wanted to spend money and buy enough Tamiflu- Massachusetts didn't even participate in the 70% discount -for spurious amd incredible reasons.
Households and communities need to look at GetPandemicReady.org and organize their own resilience.
Dr.Webster warned about this "unprecedented" virus's virulence and what it does to mammals, and said he was keeping 3 months of suplies at home. Dr.Osterholm warned too, and testified to Congress about the brittle supply chains and national security issues of letting our manufacturing of essentials disappear overseas, and that our food supply is too vulnerble to bioterrorism; Pandemic is a "12 to 18 month blizzard" he said.
Now, in Utah of all places, (not that Romney told the MA taxpayers to prepare, either, after our Feb 2006 summit) some mayor just ordered a "preparedness" day to Not present on Pandemic; ..." the city ordered him to cancel a presentation by the county Health Department on preparing for pandemics.
..."Miller said city staff told him the presentation could not happen because it would cause panic among residents.
Highland Mayor Jay Franson told the Daily Herald that the class was canceled because the presentation did not focus on families.
"The focus of the preparedness fair has been on families and personal preparedness," he said. "So the scope when you put on the pandemic and other things like that becomes a much broader issue. I think you tend to lose the focus on what families and individuals can do to prepare."
The county has been asked to talk about personal hygiene instead,"...
http://www.heraldextra.com/content/view/260000/3/
"Handwashing" by officials won't work. Delaying "panic"(or Outrage) won't work. The whole point about pandemics is that there Is much families can do -even with no vaccine and something as dangerous as airborne Ebola - only preparing can prevent "panic" except officals have never wanted the public to hear how to prepare and do it!
It takes live people to have an Economy (or to have taxpayers paying your salary and gowing your food and providing your medical care); officials; stop being so selfish and short-sighted. (Can't tell the public. Yet they don't even have workable preparations for all the dead."The military will just have to come make mass graves".Try telling the public that now; I think they would come up with a better plan.)
It is only a "hope" that virulence will drop. What would the hoarded full genetic sequences of the "atypical" US influenza deaths show? Is "Brisbane" the same as saying,"H5N1-like"?
Scientists told Dr.Nabarro back in 2005 that virulence does not have to drop to go pandemic. http://www.gartner.com/research/fellows/fellow_interview_nabarro.jsp
Influenza is contagious before symptoms; don't have to be Darwin or a virologist to see transmission occurring is all that's needed.
H5N1 is now in so many subclades and strains we are surely in for more than one wave - and in 1918 surviving one wave did Not confer "immunity" from falling ill again. Hospitals and municipalities have not bought enough PPE and the public doesn't know it is needed. Organizations "planned" by officials to "have to" do their "duty" and help check on the vulnerable, feed the hungry, and nurse the sick and help with the dead have not been told anything, or have been told AR/CFR similar to seasonal flu (nothing about current H5N1 cases, nor Mr D. Dec 5, just, "in case of emergencies, if something ever did happen") and way too much implied about "requesting" outside aid and "the SNS" and "vaccine drills"- other business-as-normal stuff that Just Isn't There for Pandemic. (Swear in and join MRC; "in case of a storm or earthquake, or a pandmeic; we'll mention what a pandemic means later.You'd be first to get PPE and antivirals and vaccine - if it was up to us, and if there was any"....)
The mayor of Highland, Utah ordered the County Health Dept to not give a free presentation to the public about pandemic?! (At least that HD wanted to! Telling the public, "is the last thing" my HD wants to do!Literally! As in, after pandemic is here.) - all levels of govt are staying too quiet about pandemicflu.gov .
What a world.Despite modern warning and containment buying us precious time, it's going to be "manage the media" 1918 all over again; except with an "unprecedented" virus, way more people, with faster travel, and, no local food,(the US pop. was 50% rural in 1918) and life-and-death reliance on the electrical and transportation grid, and "someone" coming in and meeting all local needs in catastrophies.
"Hope" that virulence will drop is not Preparedness. Prep for current worst case; fatal untreated in time, and "hope" it is not that bad, and that next wave is not that bad, but society must be mobilized now.
Science cannot make an HIV vaccine; it mutates too much. So does/has H5N1, plus, it kills the eggs used in vaccine production, and if the public isn't prepared and protected all systems will crash and I don't see vaccine breakthroughs possible during panflu.
No "delaying action possible with a public wasting money and time on non-essentials. We also need our National Guard home and helping their communities prepare - not preparing to deploy against them; to quell "civil unrest" as their long-forseen needs go unmet during pandemic. We could have mitigated the "scarce resources" problem, if society had mobilized 2 years ago (or more!). We had very credible scientific warning, and, too many places that obviously could never do what was necessary to prevent human cases.
"Just burn its way through the populace" - anyone read 1491" by C.Mann?
I agree, crfullmoon, that vents apparently don’t help much 1) in the absence of early tamiflu administration and 2) in the presence of the current H5N1 strain rearing up in Indonesia (which one is it Scott? 2.2.4 or 2.4 or … I must confess to a lack of attention on my part to the clade specifics).
I also agree that our tendency to anthropomorphize H5N1, by assuming it could bargain a portion of its lethality for the ability to go pandemic, may in the end be a fool’s game. However, I doubt the influenza researchers Scott refers to would make that mistake, and therefore I expect that those authorities have some reasoned argument for that position.
That being said, other than some reference to an increased ability of H5N1 to attach in the upper respiratory tract, potentially causing a less severe infection by avoiding deeper areas of the lung, I have not seen a reasoned argument that convinces me.
I maintain that the discussion of ventilator triage is important on several levels, of which I’ll mention two.
1) The eventual clinical course of a pandemic infection may not follow the same course that an H5N1 infection follows today.
I know, I know – it may. However, even a slight change may result in an infection that ventilation may help. What then? Like I said before, decide now how to act then.
2) The discussion itself, in the public eye, reporting in a major newspaper, can paint a picture that will impact even the most disengaged. All talk of vaccine allocation aside, contemplating pulling the plug on lovable Uncle Joe suffering from emphysema in order to treat a total stranger with pandemic influenza "has legs."
Crfullmoon,
Excellent points, each and every one. Supporting your argument that H5N1 does not have to sacrifice its lethality to go pandemic is a single sentence in a WHO report of September, 2006, released November 2006. It said that if the virus did not reassort but instead jumped directly, a reduction in its lethality was not assured. Many of us jumped all over that statement, because it meant exactly what you say in your comments.
My contacts in the influenza research arena run deep, and without attribution, I can tell you that one such scientist said that his community's theoretical "tradeoff of mortality for H2H' was, essentially, slightly more than an extremely well-educated hunch.
There is no question about the cumulative lack of preparedness across the world. Precious little attention is focused on the only things most people can control during a pandemic -- what I refer to as the things Momma taught us. We must do more to educate, and do them quickly. The value is that these things cost far less than antivirals and may wind up having the same effect. Their ROI is immediate, as constant reminders about handwashing, proper covering of sneezes and coughs and proper distance-keeping, along with higher rates of solid surface cleaning, all help reduce the incidence of seasonal influenza as well.
The report of local officials not invoking the "P" word for fear of starting a panic is the definition of risk communication mismanagement. Those are also the people who will be voted out (or worse) once a pandemic starts and the people remember that those officials did nothing to prepare them.
No government now has the resources, nor the political will, to buy PPEs in sufficient quantity in the face of this severe recession. They will perform their own risk assessment and determine that buying insulin for diabetic poor citizens is money better spent than money on masks and gloves. It is a tough argument to refute.
That is why education -- right now, today -- is so important. Better to tell people how to prepare than not, and better to give them the 1918 scenario and let H5N1's 80% CFR and let them decide their own level of comfort.
Let me share my deepest concern: That we have a severe pandemic before this current economic disaster improves. Imagine a severe pandemic on top of this recession. Imagine a CFR approaching that of SARS (roughly 10%) amid the meltdown of globalization and the death of the JIT economy, all on top of a 6% decline in GDP, and you are talking about a scenario even more frightening than 1929. Because, as you point out, in the 1918 pandemic and stretching through the Great Depression, America was still largely agrarian. And self-sustaining.
Dean,
the Indonesian clade is referred to as 2.1, although there are now at least five subclades in that nation alone -- and that is from their own scientists.
The importance of preparation aside (which I agree is paramount), you can call me insanely optimistic but we have more than antivirals and vaccines to use when this influenza pandemic arrives. No one seems to be paying attention to the weak spots for viruses. If they didn't have them, we'd have all been wiped out millions of years ago. But drug companies aren't going to make money from these ideas and doctors aren't going to know how to use them, so these ideas are hidden and will be until people starting thinking outside the antiviral/vaccine box. Organisms use all kinds of strategies to deal with viruses. My guess is that only a crisis like a pandemic will force us to look beyond antivirals and vaccines.
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